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Abstract. Vendors in the Android ecosystem typically customize their
devices by modifying Android Open Source Project (AOSP) code, adding
in-house developed proprietary software, and pre-installing third-party
applications. However, research has documented how various security
problems are associated with this customization process.
We develop a model of the Android ecosystem utilizing the concepts
of game theory and product differentiation to capture the competition
involving two vendors customizing the AOSP platform. We show how
the vendors are incentivized to differentiate their products from AOSP
and from each other, and how prices are shaped through this differentia-
tion process. We also consider two types of consumers: security-conscious
consumers who understand and care about security, and na¨ıve consumers
who lack the ability to correctly evaluate security properties of vendor-
supplied Android products or simply ignore security. It is evident that
vendors shirk on security investments in the latter case.
Regulators such as the U.S. Federal Trade Commission have sanctioned
Android vendors for underinvestment in security, but the exact effects of
these sanctions are difficult to disentangle with empirical data. Here, we
model the impact of a regulator-imposed fine that incentivizes vendors to
match a minimum security standard. Interestingly, we show how product
prices will decrease for the same cost of customization in the presence of
a fine, or a higher level of regulator-imposed minimum security.
1 Introduction
Android, the mobile operating system released under open-source licenses as
the Android Open Source Project (AOSP), has the largest market share among
smartphone platforms worldwide with more than one billion active devices [2].
Due to the openness of the platform, vendors and carriers can freely customize
features to differentiate their products from their competitors. This differentia-
tion includes customizing the hardware, but there is also a substantial fragmen-
tation in the software packages utilized in the Android ecosystem [11,15].
The fragmentation of the software base available from various vendors is due
to various customization steps, including the modification of the open source
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Android codebase as well as the addition of proprietary software. Product dif-
ferentiation may benefit consumers by providing Android devices for sale that
better match consumer tastes, and may also benefit businesses by helping them
to sidestep intense price competition of homogeneous product markets [17].
However, we also observe that Android platform fragmentation is associated
with a number of security challenges [16,18,19]. For example, Wu et al. showed
that a large proportion of security vulnerabilities in the Android ecosystem are
due to vendor customization. They calculated that this proportion is between
64% to 85% for different vendors [18]. Similarly, Zhou et al. showed how cus-
tomized drivers for security-sensitive operations on Android devices available
by different vendors often compare unfavorably to their respective counterparts
on the official Android platform [19]. Thomas et al. provided evidence for the
substantial variability of security patch practices across different vendors and
carriers [16]. Using a dataset about over 20,000 Android devices, they showed
that on average over 87% of the devices are exposed to at least one of 11 known
critical (and previously patched) vulnerabilities.4
The Android ecosystem fragmentation and the associated security problems
have caused consumer protection agencies to intervene in the marketplace. In
2013, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) charged a leading vendor because it
“failed to employ reasonable and appropriate security practices in the design and
customization of the software on its mobile devices” [8]. The case was settled
and the vendor was required to “establish a comprehensive security program
designed to address security risks during the development of new devices and
to undergo independent security assessments every other year for the next 20
years” [8]. Not observing significant improvements in the Android ecosystem,
the FTC recently solicited major vendors to provide detailed information about
their security practices including what vulnerabilities have affected their devices
as well as whether and when the company patched those vulnerabilities [7].
In this paper, we propose a product differentiation model that captures key
facets of the Android ecosystem with a focus on the quality of security. We con-
sider multiple competing vendors, who can customize Android for their products
in order to differentiate themselves from their competitors. We consider both
security-conscious consumers, who value security quality, and na¨ıve consumers,
who do not take security issues into consideration when they make adoption
choices. When consumers are na¨ıve, vendors do not have any incentives to ad-
dress security issues arising from the customization. In order to incentivize in-
vesting in security, a regulator may impose a fine on vendors that do not uphold
a desired level of security. We show that fines can achieve the desired effect, and
we study how they impact the competitive landscape in the Android ecosystem.
Roadmap. In Section 2, we provide background on Android customization
and the associated security challenges. Section 3 presents the economic model on
Android customization. We analyze the model without a fine in Section 4 and
4 Further compounding the problem scenario is how third-party apps targeting out-
dated Android versions and thereby disabling important security changes to the
Android platform cause additional fragmentation [14].
consider how to calculate the parameters in our model in Section 5. We extend
the model to the case with a regulator-imposed fine in Section 6. We support
our analysis with numerical results in Section 7. We conclude in Section 8.
2 Background
Customization: One approach to measure the level of customization by vendors
is provenance analysis [18], which studies the distribution and origin of apps
on Android devices. There are mainly three sources of app origins on Android
devices: (1) AOSP: apps available in the default AOSP that, however, can be
customized by a vendor; (2) Vendor: apps that were developed by that vendor;
and (3) Third-party: apps that are not in AOSP and were not developed by the
vendor.
Table 1 summarizes the published findings of a provenance analysis of five
popular vendors: Google, Samsung, HTC, Sony, and LG [18]. The authors found
that on average 18.22%, 64.41%, and 17.38% of apps originate from AOSP, ven-
dors, and third parties, respectively. Further, the number of apps and lines of
code (LoC) associated with the devices are increasing with newly released ver-
sions. Likewise, the complexity of the baseline AOSP is increasing over time [18].
AOSP vendor 3rd-party
Vendor Device Version and Build# #apps #LOC #apps #LOC #apps #LOC #apps #LOC
Samsung Galaxy S2 2.3.4; 19100XWKI4 172 10M 26 2.4M 114 3.5M 32 4.1M
Samsung Galaxy S3 4.0.4; 19300UBALF5 185 17M 30 6.3M 119 5.6M 36 5.3M
HTC Wildfire S 2.3.5; CL362953 147 9.6M 24 2.7M 94 3.5M 29 3.3M
HTC One X 4.0.4; CL100532 280 19M 29 4.7M 190 7.3M 61 7.5M
LG Optimus P350 2.2; FRG83 100 6.1M 27 1.1M 40 0.6M 33 4.4M
LG Optimus P880 4.0.3; IML74K 115 12M 28 3.1M 63 3.2M 24 5.6M
Sony Xperia Arc S 2.3.4; 4.0.2.A.0.62 176 7.6M 28 1.1M 123 2.6M 25 3.8M
Sony Xperia SL 4.0.4; 6.1.A.2.45 209 10M 28 1.8M 156 4.1M 25 4.7M
Google Nexus S 2.3.6; GRK39F 73 5.2M 31 1M 41 2.8M 1 1.3M
Google Nexus 4 4.2; JOP40C 91 15M 31 2.5M 57 12M 3 1.1M
Table 1. Provenance analysis [18].
One of the challenges in this fragmented ecosystem is the security risk that
arises from the vendors’ and carriers’ customization to enrich their systems’
functionality without fully understanding the security implications of their cus-
tomizations. In this paper, our focus is on security issues resulting from such
customization. Hence, we focus on this issue in the following subsection.
Security Impact of Customization: The problems related to security as-
pects of Android customization are mainly due to vendors’ change of critical
configurations. These changes include altering security configurations of Linux
device drivers and system apps, etc. One approach for better understanding
the effect of customization is to compare security features of different Android
devices with each other, which is called differential analysis. Aafer et al. pro-
posed a number of security features to take into account [1]. First, permissions
which protect data, functionalities, and inner components can be analyzed. In
Android, we have four level of permissions: Normal, Dangerous, Signature, Sys-
temOrSignature. The goal of differential analysis is to find a permission with
a different (and typically lower) level of protection on some devices. Second,
group IDs (GIDs) are another feature to take into account. Some lower-level
GIDs are given Android permissions, which could potentially be mapped into a
privileged permission due to customization. Protected broadcasts sent by system
level processes are a third important security feature. Due to customization, some
protected broadcasts could be removed and, as a result, apps can be triggered
by not only system-level processes but also by untrusted third-party apps.
By comparing these security features, Aafer et al. found that the smaller the
vendor is, the more significant inconsistencies are observable for the different
security features. One interpretation is that the cost of investment in security
is too high for those vendors (e.g., hiring of security experts). The results also
imply that different vendors invest in security to different degrees.
Research aiming to understand Android customization is clearly demonstrat-
ing that customization is a pervasive feature in Android, and this is associated
with a wide variety of security challenges and vulnerabilities. Further, we are
unaware of any research that provides evidence for security improvements re-
sulting from customization, which outweighs the aforementioned risks. At the
same time, research is missing that aims to understand the economic forces as-
sociated with the customization process which is the objective of our work.
3 Model Definition
In this section, we propose our baseline model in the tradition of game theory
and the theory of product differentiation [17,12]. Our model considers three types
of entities: (1) AOSP, (2) vendors, such as Samsung or LG, and (3) consumers.
AOSP: Google, the developer of Android, provides monthly security updates
for its devices and for base Android. However, other vendors have to adjust
AOSP security updates for their Android devices because of their customization.
Further, customization may also introduce new security vulnerabilities.
To incorporate these effects into our model, we assume that a customized ver-
sion of Android can be represented by a point on the segment [0, 1]. Our analysis
could be extended to multidimensional customizations in a straightforward way,
but we assume one dimension for ease of presentation, since our focus is on the
relative level of customization rather than its direction. Moreover, the location
of each Android customization is independent of objective measures of product
quality. In other words, we map the features of a mobile device to a point on
the segment [0, 1] to quantify its difference (e.g., percentage of customized code)
from the base version of Android provided by AOSP. In our model, ZA denotes
the point corresponding to the base version of AOSP. Since AOSP aims to pro-
vide a base version that maximizes the market share of Android, it provides a
version that can attract the widest range of consumers. Hence, in the numerical
analysis, we assume that AOSP is in the middle, i.e., ZA = 0.5.
Vendor: There are multiple vendors selling Android devices. Carriers can
sell the vendors’ Android devices with their own prices and customizations too.
Here, we will use the term “vendor” to refer to both vendors and carriers. The
price and the market share of the device sold by vendor i are denoted by pi and
Di, respectively. Further, qi denotes the security quality of patches delivered by
vendor i. We assume that pi ≥ 0 (product prices are non-negative) and qi ≥ 0
(security quality is represented by a non-negative number) for every vendor i.
Similar to the AOSP base version, a point zi ∈ [0, 1] represents the customization
of the Android version of vendor i.
We consider two types of costs for customization. First, through customiza-
tion, the vendor makes its product different from what Google has developed in
AOSP. Hence, the vendor incurs development cost, which is related to the de-
gree of customization. Here, we model this cost as a convex quadratic function
of the difference between the vendor’s position and the positions of the AOSP
base version. Second, the security related cost of a vendor depends not only on
the quality and frequency of security updates provided by the vendor, but also
on the difference due to customization. Vendors receive security patch updates
from AOSP, but due to customizations, vendors need to adapt these security
patches before distribution. Often, vendors degrade the quality or frequency of
security patches in order to save development and distribution costs [16]. Hence,
the security-related cost is affected by both the customization level and the se-
curity quality. In our model, we employ a convex quadratic function to capture
how the security cost of vendor i depends on qi. The utility of vendor i is equal
to:
pii = piDi − Ci (zi − ZA)2 − Siq2i (zi − ZA)2 , (1)
where Ci and Si are constants representing cost per unit of customization and
security quality, respectively. Here, we focus on security issues resulting from
Android customization rather than security-related cost of AOSP explicitly.
We have considered quadratic functions for the cost terms, which is a common
assumption for modeling customization costs, e.g., see [4] and [6]. The quadratic
cost function captures the fact that the cost of customization increases as the
customization increases. In a similar way, with an increase in the cost of cus-
tomization or the quality of security, the security cost resulting from customiza-
tion increases. It would be possible to use any functional form with increasing
marginal cost, such as an exponential cost function, which would lead to the
same qualitative results as the ones presented here.
We also consider the quality of security patch updates provided by AOSP,
denoted by Q, to be an exogenous parameter in our model, which applies to all
vendors in the same way. Note that we observe that in practice, vendors virtu-
ally never provide better security quality. Further, we are primarily interested
in studying the effect of customization on security; hence, we will not consider
vendors implementing additional security measures that are independent of cus-
tomization. Hence, we assume that the value of qi is upper bounded by Q.
Consumers: Consumers choose mobile devices primarily based on prices
and how well the devices match their preferences, but they may also consider
security quality. A consumer’s preference, similar to a vendor’s customization,
can be represented by a point x in [0, 1]. Consumers’ preferences for smartphone
selection are heterogeneous and we assume that the consumers’ preferences are
distributed uniformly in [0, 1]. We consider security-conscious consumers who
take security into account when choosing their product. The utility of consumer j
for choosing Android type i given that consumer j is at xj is:
uij = βqi − pi − T
(
xj − zi
)2
, (2)
where T represents the consumer’s utility loss for one unit of difference between
its preference and the location of the product, which we call customization-
importance. Similarly, β represents the consumer’s utility gain for one unit of
security quality, which we call security-importance. Na¨ıve consumers, who do not
understand or care about security quality, can be modeled by letting β = 0.
Our utility for consumers is in agreement with literature in economics [5]. It
is common to consider quadratic term in economics to model utility.
Game Formulation: For tractability, we consider a two-player game be-
tween vendor 1 and vendor 2 without any other vendors.5 In our analysis, we
assume that vendors are on different sides of AOSP. Further, we let a = z1 and
1−b = z2. Without loss of generality, we assume that 0 ≤ a ≤ 1−b ≤ 1. Figure 1
shows the location of vendor 1 and vendor 2.
The utilities of vendors 1 and 2 are then as follows:
pi1 = p1D1 − C1 (a− ZA)2 − S1q21 (a− ZA)2 , (3)
pi2 = p2D2 − C2 (1− b− ZA)2 − S2q22 (1− b− ZA)2 . (4)
0 1Vendor 1 AOSP Vendor 2
a b
Fig. 1. Location of vendor 1 and vendor 2.
To calculate the Nash equilibrium, we need to define the stages of the game,
i.e., the order in which the two players choose their prices, locations, and security
levels. For our analysis, we consider the following stages:
• Stage 1: Both vendors simultaneously choose their location parameters a
and b. They also choose their level of security quality, i.e., q1 and q2.
• Stage 2: Both vendors simultaneously choose their prices p1 and p2.
The reason is that a vendor freely modifies the AOSP code base, adds its
developed proprietary software, and installs a diverse set of third-party apps to
customize its device. These changes, however, result in the change of critical
configurations leading to security issues [16,18,19]. Therefore, it is reasonable
to consider that the customization and security quality effort happen at the
same stage. Then, by taking into account its effort in customization and security
quality, the vendor chooses its price. We use backward induction to solve our
game. First, we consider stage 2 and calculate the price Nash equilibrium for
5 While we restrict our model to two vendors, we are aware that in practice, there
are more than two vendors competing with each other. However, we believe that
similar to classic economic studies with two companies in the context of product
differentiation, our model provides a meaningful understanding of the customization
in the Android ecosystem and of security quality.
given locations and quality. Then, we consider stage 1 and calculate the location
and quality equilibrium assuming a price equilibrium in stage 2.
Table 2 shows a list of the symbols used in our model.
Table 2. List of Symbols
Symbol Description
ZA Point corresponding to AOSP
Di Market share of vendor i
zi Customization of the Android version of vendor i
pi Price of vendor i
qi Security quality of patches delivered by vendor i
Si Cost per unit of security quality
Ci Cost per unit of customization
pii Utility of vendor i
Q Quality of security patch updates provided by AOSP
β Consumer’s security-importance
T Consumer’s customization-importance
xj Consumer’s location
uij Utility of consumer j for choosing Android type i
qmin Minimum level of security from the regulator’s point of view
fi Fine function for vendor i
F Monetary value of fine for each unit of violation from qmin
4 Analytical Results
In this section, we analyze our proposed model. Before considering the two stages,
we first have to find the market shares of both vendors. To do so, we need to
find the point in which a consumer j is indifferent between choosing vendor 1’s
product and vendor 2’s product. This means that a user’s preference at this
point is identical for the two products. Hence, we have:
u1j = u
2
j ⇒ βq1 − p1 − T
(
xj − a
)2
= βq2 − p2 − T
(
1− b− xj
)2
. (5)
Solving the above equation yields:
D1 = xj = a+
1− a− b
2
+
β (q1 − q2)
2T (1− a− b) +
p2 − p1
2T (1− a− b) . (6)
All of the consumers that are on the left side of xj choose the product of
vendor 1. As a result, the market share of vendor 1 is D1 = xj . This means
that for equal prices and security qualities, vendor 1 controls its own “turf” of
size a and the consumers located between vendor 1 and vendor 2 that are closer
to vendor 1 than vendor 2. The last two terms represent the effect of security
quality and price differentiation on the demand, respectively.
We restrict the model to consumers who definitely choose between these two
products, which is a reasonable assumption for a wide range of parameters given
the “cannot-live-without-it” desirability of modern phones, which is a valid as-
sumption in economics, see [17]. Hence, the remaining consumers choose vendor
2’s product and its demand is:
D2 = 1−D1 = b+ 1− a− b
2
+
β (q2 − q1)
2T (1− a− b) +
p1 − p2
2T (1− a− b) . (7)
If two vendors are at the same location, they provide functionally identical
products. For a consumer who takes into account customization, price, and se-
curity quality, the factors that matter in this case are security quality and price.
To increase their market share, vendors have to decrease their prices or increase
their security quality. This will lead to lower product prices and higher costs
due to higher security quality, and significantly lower – and eventually zero –
utility for both vendors. Hence, vendors have no incentives for implementing
customizations that result in identical product locations.
Price Competition: In the following, we state the price Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1 The unique price Nash equilibrium always exists, and it is
p∗1 =
β
3
(q1 − q2) + T (1− a− b)
(
1 +
a− b
3
)
, (8)
p∗2 =
β
3
(q2 − q1) + T (1− a− b)
(
1 +
b− a
3
)
. (9)
Proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix B.1.
In Theorem 1, the price of a product depends on both the security quality
and the customization level of both vendors. Further, the price depends on the
customization importance T and security-importance β constants, which model
the consumers in our model. A vendor can increase its price by improving its
security quality or customizing its devices more.
Quality and Product Choice: To calculate the Nash equilibrium of both
vendors in terms of location and security quality, we consider the following op-
timization problems.
Vendor 1 maximizes its utility in q1 and a considering that p1 is calculated
according to Equation 8. For vendor 1, we have:
maximize
a, q1
p∗1D1 − C1 (a− ZA)2 − S1q21 (a− ZA)2
subject to p∗1 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ a ≤ ZA, 0 ≤ q1 ≤ Q.
(10)
The constraints in the above optimization problem reflect our previous as-
sumptions about the parameters in our model definition. For each value of b
and q2, the solution of the above optimization problem provides vendor 1’s best
response. In a similar way, for vendor 2, we have:
maximize
b, q2
p∗2D2 − C2 (1− b− ZA)2 − S2q22 (1− b− ZA)2
subject to p∗2 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ b ≤ ZA, 0 ≤ q2 ≤ Q.
(11)
For given values of a and q1, the above optimization problem provides vendor
2’s best response. Based on the Nash equilibrium definition, the intersection of
these two optimization problems gives the Nash equilibrium of our proposed
game, i.e., a∗, b∗, q∗1 , and q
∗
2 . In Appendix B.2 , we provide our method for
solving these two optimization problems and for finding the Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1 When consumers take into account security, zero investment in se-
curity for both vendors, i.e., q1 = q2 = 0, is not a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 1 is provided in Appendix B.3.
The above lemma shows that when consumers take into account security,
then vendors have to invest to improve their security quality. However, it is
challenging for the majority of consumers to measure by themselves the security
quality of a product, or in this case, to make a comparison between the security
quality of many versions of Android provided by the vendors. Consumers mainly
rely on information that is made available to them.6 However, in the absence of
any reliable market signal, any unsubstantiated communication/advertisements
by vendors about security quality have to be considered with caution.7
Previous research has shown that businesses aim to exploit such information
barriers. In particular, the theory of informational market power posits that
when it is hard for consumers to understand and/or observe certain features
of a product (e.g., security quality), then businesses are incentivized to under-
invest in these product features and rather focus on easily observable aspects
such as product design and price [3].8 Any effect of informational market power
is emphasized by well-known human biases such as omission neglect [13]. This
describes the human lack of sensitivity about product features that are not the
focus of advertisements or product communications; to paraphrase, consumers
will not include in their perceived utilities product features which are not empha-
sized. Therefore, in Appendix A, we consider an important baseline case of na¨ıve
consumers. In particular, we show that our model is in agreement with what we
have seen in practice, i.e., vendors do not invest in security when consumers are
na¨ıve. Further, we determine under what conditions maximal differentiation, i.e.,
a∗ = b∗ = 0, is Nash equilibrium; see Proposition 2 in Appendix A.
6 While we have identified a small set of research projects which aim to understand
the security impact of customization, e.g., [16,18,19], we are unaware of any well-
known market signals regarding the security of different Android versions. The recent
FTC initiative to solicit security-relevant data from vendors may contribute to such
signals in the future [7].
7 In fact, research by Wu et al. shows that vendors of different reputation (which
may also influence perceptions regarding Android security) all suffer from similar
challenges due to Android customization [18].
8 Note that it is not required that businesses have an accurate assessment of the
security quality of their own product (or competitors’ products) for informational
market power to be exploited.
5 Parameter Selection
In the previous section, the goal of our analyses was to find these six variables:
p1, p2, q1, q2, a, and b. In addition to these six variables, we have six parameters,
which are β, T , C1, C2, S1, and S2. In this section, we discuss how we can quantify
these six parameters in practice. In doing so, we use a reverse approach. First,
we measure the values of p1, p2, q1, q2, a, and b. Then, based on our analyses in
the previous section, we calculate the values of the constants in our model.
AOSP vendor 3rd-party
Vendor Device Version
and Build#
#apps #LOC #apps #LOC #apps #LOC #apps #LOC
HTC (vendor 1) One X 4.0.4;
CL100532
280 19M 29 4.7M 190 7.3M 61 7.5M
Samsung (vendor 2) Galaxy S3 4.0.4;
19300UBALF5
185 17M 30 6.3M 119 5.6M 36 5.3M
Table 3. Origin of apps in two devices [18].
Location Quantification: In order to quantify customization and map it
to a location, we need to quantify how different two Android versions are in
terms of the pre-loaded apps. To do so, we can access the image of an Android
OS version, e.g., see [18] and [1], and investigate how many apps a vendor has
developed for a specific version.
To quantify customization, we use the results of Table 3 and calculate the
proportion of the code that was developed by a vendor. Note that in our model,
we assume that the locations are in the interval [0, 1]. First, we need to specify
the location of ZA and then select the location of other vendors. Here, we assume
that ZA = 0.5. In HTC One X (i.e., vendor 1), 7,354,468 LoC were developed
by the vendor and 7,550,704 LoC were from third-party apps. This means that
about 75.95% of lines of code were added by that vendor to the baseline AOSP
version. Here, we interpret this number as the level of difference between its
device and AOSP. In order to keep the value of a in the interval [0, 0.5], we let
a = ZA − (percentage/2). Therefore, we have a = ZA − (0.7595/2) = 0.1203.
In a similar way, for Samsung Galaxy 3 (i.e., vendor 2) 5,660,569 LOC were
developed by the vendor in addition to 5,334,152 LoC selected from third-party
apps, which is equal to 63.41% of the total number of LOC. In a similar way, we
let b = 1− ZA − (0.6341/2) = 0.1830.
Quality: To quantify q1 and q2, we use the analysis reported in [18]. Ac-
cording to their analysis, the maximum number of vulnerabilities for a device
among these 10 devices is 40. Some of these vulnerabilities are the result of ven-
dor customization. For HTC One X, they have found 15 vulnerabilities, and 10
of these vulnerabilities are due to vendor customization. By dividing the num-
ber of vulnerabilities resulting from customization with the maximum number
of vulnerabilities, we get 0.25. In order to calculate security quality, we let
q1 = 1− #Customization V ulnerabilities
Maximum#V ulnerabilities
= 0.75.
In a similar way, for Samsung Galaxy S3, they found 40 vulnerabilities, and 33
of these are the result of customization. Hence, we have q2 = 1− 3340 = 0.1750.
Price: The prices of HTC One X and Samsung Galaxy S3 are equal to
e170 [9] and e190 [10], respectively. GSM Arena (http://www.gsmarena.com/)
groups both of these devices as group 4 out of 10 for their price. Here, we consider
p1 = p2 = 4.
Parameter Estimation: By assigning these six parameters into our model
analysis, we can calculate the six constants in our model. Here, we assume that
both vendors are completely rational and as result, they have chosen their cus-
tomization levels, prices, and security qualities according to our proposed model.
Therefore, we can calculate constant parameters in our model in a reverse way.
By inserting our quantified parameters, i.e., a, b, q1, q2, p1, and p2, into Equa-
tions 8 and 9, we have two equations and two variables, i.e., β and T . The
answer of this system of equations gives the values of β and T . Note that these
two equations are linear in T and β. Therefore, the resulting answer is unique.
To calculate the values of C1, C2, S1, and S2, we assume that the measured
values of q1, q2, a, b form a Nash equilibrium of our game. Since the vendors’
strategies are mutual best responses in a Nash equilibrium, q1, q2, a, b are so-
lutions to the corresponding best-response equations, i.e., Equations 34, 47, 40,
and 52, respectively. We have four variables and four equations. The solution of
this system of equations provides the values of S1, C1, S2, C2, which are unique.
Therefore, based on the measured values, we have β = 0.4362, T = 5.7414,
S1 = 0.6723, C1 = 1.4882, S2 = 4.1338, and C2 = 2.4875.
6 Fine Model and Analysis
Our previous analysis shows vendors’ poor practice of security issues arising
from customization. In particular, we have shown that vendors will not invest
in security issues of customization if the consumers do not take security into
account. Here, we propose a mechanism to force a vendor to invest in adequate
security quality. In doing so, we introduce a regulator whose role is to define the
policy that forces every vendor to invest in an adequate level of security. More
specifically, we propose a fine function for a regulatory policy which takes as
input the vendor’s security quality and outputs the monetary value of the fine
imposed on the vendor. In doing so, we define the following fine function for
vendor i:
fi(qi) =
{
F
(
qmin − qi
)
if qmin ≥ qi
0 otherwise,
(12)
where F and qmin are constants defined by the regulator. qmin is the minimum
acceptable level of security from the regulator’s point of view and the regulator
tries to force each vendor to satisfy at least this security level. F is a coefficient
relating quality to monetary value and denotes the monetary value of fine for
each unit of security violation from qmin for a vendor. The monetary value of
the fine should be proportional to the market share, since a higher market share
of a vendor with security issues results in a higher number of consumers with
vulnerabilities. In our model, we multiplied fi by the market share of that vendor.
In this section, we show that under certain conditions, a regulator can force
a vendor to spend on security issues resulting from customization. Moreover, we
prove that the product’s price decreases as the vendor invests in the adequate
level of security imposed by the regulator, for the same value of customization
cost. More specifically, our analysis shows that under some conditions, the higher
the security quality imposed by the regulator is, the lower the product’s price is.
By imposing a fine, the vendors’ utilities change to the following:
pi1 = p1D1 − C1 (a− ZA)2 − S1q21 (a− ZA)2 − f1D1. (13)
pi2 = p2D2 − C2 (1− b− ZA)2 − S2q22 (1− b− ZA)2 − f2D2. (14)
It is worth mentioning that the consumers’ utility does not change. Hence,
all of Equations 5, 6, and 7 are still valid for the case when there is a fine. The
validity of these equations implies that the formulae for the vendors’ market
share is the same for both cases. However, the vendors’ equilibrium prices are
different compared to the previous case.
Similar to the case without a fine, here we have the same two stages with
the same ordering. The regulator’s goal is to force the vendors to invest in an
adequate security level. Hence, in our analysis, we focus on the case where the
regulator forces the vendor to invest in an adequate security quality level.
Theorem 2 characterizes both vendors’ prices in Nash equilibrium when the
regulator imposes a fine.
Theorem 2 The Nash equilibrium in prices, which always exists, is
p∗1 =
β
3
(q1 − q2) + T (1− a− b)
(
1 +
a− b
3
)
+
2f1
3
+
f2
3
, (15)
p∗2 =
β
3
(q2 − q1) + T (1− a− b)
(
1 +
b− a
3
)
+
2f2
3
+
f1
3
. (16)
This theorem is proved in Appendix B.4. By comparing the above two equa-
tions with Equations 8 and 9, we observe that the introduction of a fine will
increase the product price of the vendors for fixed locations and security level.
Na¨ıve Consumers: Based on Theorem 2, by letting β = 0, we can characterize
the price NE for na¨ıve consumers (which is shown in Appendix A.2). Lemma 2
introduces the sufficient conditions to force vendors to invest in adequate level
of security, when consumers do not take into account security.
Lemma 2 Both vendors invest in q∗1 = q
∗
2 = q
min, if the following conditions
are satisfied for the optimal locations of both vendors:
F 2 − 18TS1 (1− a− b) (a− ZA)2 ≥ 0, (17)
F 2 − 18TS2 (1− a− b) (1− b− ZA)2 ≥ 0, (18)
3 + a− b− Fq
min
T (1− a− b) ≥ 0. (19)
Proof of the above lemma is provided in Appendix B.6.
Lemma 3 calculates the location Nash equilibrium of both vendors consider-
ing that the regulator forces the vendors to invest in adequate levels of security.
Lemma 3 For given b, the vendor 1’s best response for location when the con-
sumers do not take into account security and conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied,
is as follows:
•C1 + S1
(
qmin
)2 ≤ T12ZA : Vendor 1 differentiates its product the most, i.e.,
a∗(b) = 0.
•C1+S1
(
qmin
)2 ≥ T9ZA : The positive root of the following quadratic equation
is called a2. In this case, for vendor 1 we have a
∗(b) = min{a2, ZA}.
− 3Ta2 + a
(
2Tb− 10T − 36
(
C1 + S1
(
qmin
)2))
+ T
(
b2 − 2b− 3
)
+ 36
(
C1 + S1
(
qmin
)2)
ZA = 0 (20)
• T12ZA < C1+S1
(
qmin
)2
< T9ZA and b ≤ min{1−
√
4− 36
(
C1+S1(qmin)
2
)
T ZA, ZA}:
Vendor 1 chooses its location as a∗(b) = min{a2, ZA}.
• T12ZA < C1 + S1
(
qmin
)2
< T9ZA and 1 −
√
4− 36
(
C1+S1(qmin)
2
)
T ZA ≤ ZA
and 1−
√
4− 36
(
C1+S1(qmin)
2
)
T ZA ≤ b ≤ ZA: Vendor 1 differentiates its product
the most, i.e., a∗(b) = 0.
By changing C1 to C2, S1 to S2, a to b, and ZA to (1− ZA), in the above
lemma, we can derive the same results for vendor 2. Proof of Lemma 3 is provided
in Appendix B.7.
Comparing this lemma with Lemma 4 (Appendix A.1), we see maximal dif-
ferentiation occurs when the cost of customization is lower than when there is
no fine, since a vendor’s cost is affected by both the costs of customization and
security quality. Further, according to Equation 20, the location NE depends
on qmin rather than F . However, both F and qmin have the effect to satisfy
the conditions for forcing a vendor to invest in adequate level of security, i.e.,
Lemma 2.
7 Numerical Illustration
In this section, we evaluate our findings numerically. First, we evaluate the case
where there are no fines and the consumers are na¨ıve. Second, we evaluate the
case in which consumers are na¨ıve, but a regulator imposes fines. Then, we
compare the equilibrium prices and locations in the absence and in the presence
of the regulatory fine. Interestingly, we observe that the products’ prices (of
both vendors) decrease in the presence of fines, and both vendors invest in the
adequate level of security qmin set by the regulator. Finally, we evaluate the case
in which there are no fines but the consumers take into account security quality.
Figure 2 shows both vendors’ equilibrium locations for various values of cus-
tomization costs C1 and C2. To find Nash equilibrium, we use Lemma 4 and
its counterpart for vendor 2 to calculate each vendor’s best-response location.
Then, considering that NE is mutual best response, the intersection of these two
best responses gives the equilibrium locations of both vendors. Once we have the
equilibrium locations, we can easily calculate the equilibrium prices according to
Lemma 1. Based on Figure 2, the higher the cost of customization (e.g., C1) is,
the lower a vendor’s differentiation from AOSP baseline model is (e.g., the higher
the value of a∗ is). Note that in Figure 2(b) for C2 = 0, vendor 2 chooses the
maximum level of customization (i.e., b∗ = 0) regardless of the vendor 1’s cus-
tomization level. According to Lemma 4 and its counterpart for vendor 2, when
the cost of customization is lower than a threshold (i.e., when C2 ≤ T12(1−ZA) ),
vendor 2 chooses the maximum level of customization. As we see in Figure 2(c),
the customization level of vendor 1, i.e., a∗, changes only a little with changes in
vendor 2’s customization cost. For example, when the customization cost of ven-
dor 2 increases, vendor 2 chooses lower level of customization (i.e., higher value
of b∗), while vendor 1 increases its customization level (i.e., lowers the value of
a∗) a little compared to its opponent. However, as we observe in Figures 2(c)
and 2(d), the prices of both vendors change more significantly compared to their
locations with respect to changes in customization costs. Based on Lemma 1 (see
Equation 21), a decrease in the customization level of vendor 2 lowers the values
of both (1− a− b) and
(
1 + a−b3
)
. As a result, vendors enter price competition
and decrease their prices, which is shown in Figures 2(c) and 2(d).
In Figure 3, we examine the effect of regulation on location, price, and secu-
rity quality for various values of C1 and C2. In our evaluation, in the presence of
a regulator, the conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied. As a result, both vendors
invest in qmin set by the regulator. Similar to the case without any fine, the
higher the customization cost (e.g., C1) is, the lower the differentiation from
the baseline AOSP is (e.g., the higher the value of a∗ is). Similarly, we again
observe little changes in a vendor’s location in response to changes in its oppo-
nent’s customization cost and the customization level. Further, the equilibrium
prices of both vendors are decreased by an increase in customization costs, since
both of them choose lower levels of customization and enter a price competition.
Note that even in the presence of fines, vendor 2 chooses the maximum level of
customization (i.e., b∗ = 0) when C2 = 0, considering that its cost of security
is proportional to its level of customization and S2 > S1. The reason for this is
that vendor 2 is reluctant to enter a price competition.
In Figure 4, we compare the equilibria in the presence and the absence of
a regulatory fine, when consumers do not take into account security. Based on
Figure 4(c), vendor 1 chooses a lower level of customization when a fine exists.
Figure 4(d) shows that vendor 2 chooses the same location in both cases as we
discussed earlier when C2 = 0. For C2 = 3, vendor 2 chooses a lower level of
customization (i.e., higher value of b∗) compared to the case when there is no fine.
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Fig. 2. Equilibrium locations and prices of both vendor 1 and vendor 2 when consumers
do not take into account security, there is no fine, and T = 8.
Consequently, the prices of both vendors are lower for higher customization costs
due to the fact that both vendors are moving closer to the AOSP baseline model.
Moreover, the existence of regulation and the fine leads to higher values of a∗ and
b∗ (i.e., lower customization levels) for the same customization costs compared to
the case without a fine, since each vendor tries to maximize its utility by avoiding
regulatory fine through investing in the minimum level of security quality qmin.
Therefore, each vendor has to pay both the cost of customization as well as the
cost of security quality resulting from customization. To decrease these costs,
each vendor chooses a lower level of customization. Further, choosing higher
values of a∗ and b∗ (i.e., lower customization level) leads to lower prices for both
vendors. Therefore, the existence of a regulatory fine leads to more secure
products at lower prices when consumers do not care about security.
To find equilibrium locations and security qualities when consumers take into
account security but there is no fine, we calculate each vendor’s best-response se-
curity quality and location for its opponent’s given location and security quality.
Then, the Nash equilibrium is the intersection of these best responses. Table 4
shows the equilibrium for various values of C1, where T = 1.6, β = 0.6, C2 = 1.3,
Q = 1, and S1 = S2 = 1. In this case, due to the consumers’ security consid-
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
a
Vendor 1 Customization Nash Equilibrium
C2=0
C2=1.5
C2=3
C2=4.5
(a) a∗
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
b
Vendor 2 Customization Nash Equilibrium
C2=0
C2=1.5
C2=3
C2=4.5
(b) b∗
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C1
3
4
5
6
7
8
a
Vendor 1 Price Nash Equilibrium
C2=0
C2=1.5
C2=3
C2=4.5
(c) p∗1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C1
3
4
5
6
7
8
p 2
Vendor 2 Price Nash Equilibrium
C2=0
C2=1.5
C2=3
C2=4.5
(d) p∗2
Fig. 3. Equilibrium locations and prices for various values of C1 and C2. Here, con-
sumers are na¨ıve, but there is a regulatory fine, and T = 8, S1 = 0.602, S2 = 1.54,
F = 10, and qmin = 0.4. For these values of C1 and C2 and choices of a and b, both
vendors invest in qmin set by the regulator.
eration, both vendors invest in security. For C1 = 0, vendor 1 maximizes its
differentiation from baseline AOSP. Because of the consumers’ security aware-
ness, vendor 1 invests in security, but at a lower level than Q. It is interesting
to see that vendor 2 does not differentiate its product from the baseline AOSP
version due to maximal differentiation of vendor 1 and consequently, it does not
have any security issues resulting from customization (i.e., q∗2 = Q = 1).
It is noteworthy that both vendors invest in the maximum level of security
when both vendors’ customization costs are greater than zero. This observation
shows that if all consumers are capable of measuring security quality and it is one
of the factors affecting their product choice, then vendors will invest in security.
Similar to the case where consumers do not take into account security, the higher
the customization cost is, the lower the customization level is. In other words,
increasing C1 results in higher values of a
∗. Moreover, changing the value of C1,
while C2 is fixed, results in little changes in b
∗.
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Fig. 4. Comparison between the presence and the absence of a fine for na¨ıve consumers.
We have T = 8, S1 = 0.602, S2 = 1.54, F = 10, and q
min = 0.4.
8 Conclusion
Our model shows that vendors have to invest in security quality for security-
conscious consumers. Further, for na¨ıve consumers, our proposed model captures
the fact that vendors underinvest in security. To incentivize vendors to invest
in security for na¨ıve consumers, a regulator may assign a fine to those vendors
that do not uphold a desired level of security, which is a well-motivated scenario
given Android-related FTC actions [8].
We show that the imposed fine structure achieves the expected effect in
addition to changes in the competitive landscape. First, the price of the product
decreases for the same cost of customization compared to the case without any
fine. Second, a higher level of security quality imposed by the regulator leads to a
lower product price, if certain conditions are satisfied. Our findings suggest that
requiring higher baseline levels of security investments (as triggered by recent
FTC actions [8]) does not impose higher product prices on na¨ıve consumers,
which is important from a technology policy perspective. Moreover, increasing
consumers’ attention about security is substantiated by our analysis as a positive
and meaningful factor to address challenges related to informational market
power and neglected security efforts.
C1 a
∗ q∗1 b
∗ q∗2
0 0 0.2612 0.5 1
0.3684 0.2888 1 0.3639 1
0.7368 0.3195 1 0.3638 1
1.1053 0.3452 1 0.3637 1
1.4737 0.3677 1 0.3636 1
Table 4. The vendors’ equilibrium prices and security qualities for various values of
C1. Here, we have S1 = S2 = 1, T = 1.6, β = 0.6, Q = 1, and C2 = 1.3.
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A Consumers Without Security Consideration
A.1 Consumers Without Security Consideration
In this section, we consider a special case of our model, where the consumers
do not take into account security. This means that, we have β = 0 and the
derivations to calculate the price and quality Nash Equilibrium follow directly.
The following two lemmas state their values.
Proposition 1 The unique price Nash equilibrium, which always exists, is
p∗1 = T (1− a− b)
(
1 +
a− b
3
)
, (21)
p∗2 = T (1− a− b)
(
1 +
b− a
3
)
. (22)
Proof. Proposition 1 can be derived by assigning β = 0 in Theorem 1. uunionsq
The following corollary represents the vendors’ lack of incentives to invest in
security-related efforts when consumers cannot measure security quality.
Corollary 1 In any Nash equilibrium, both vendors invest zero in security, i.e.,
q∗1 = q
∗
2 = 0.
Proof. Note that when β = 0, the market share of each vendor does not
depend on security quality. In order to calculate q1, we have:
dpi1
dq1
= −2q1S1 (a− ZA)2 , (23)
which is decreasing for non-negative values of q1. Therefore, we have q
∗
1 = 0.
In a similar way, for vendor 2 we have q∗2 = 0. uunionsq
The following lemma represents vendor 1’s level of customization best re-
sponse, i.e., a, given the customization level of its opponent, i.e., b.
Lemma 4 For given b, vendor 1’s best response for location when the consumers
do not take security into account is as follows:
•C1 ≤ T12ZA : Vendor 1 differentiates its product as much as possible, i.e.,
a∗(b) = 0.
•C1 ≥ T9ZA : The positive root of the following quadratic equation in a is
called a2. In this case, for vendor 1 we have a
∗(b) = min{a2, ZA}.
− 3Ta2 + a (2Tb− 10T − 36C1) + T
(
b2 − 2b− 3
)
+ 36C1ZA = 0 (24)
• T12ZA < C1 < T9ZA and 0 ≤ b ≤ min{ZA, 1 −
√
4− 36C1T ZA}: Vendor 1
chooses its location as a∗(b) = min{a2, ZA}.
• T12ZA < C1 < T9ZA and 1 −
√
4− 36C1T ZA ≤ ZA and 1 −
√
4− 36C1T ZA ≤
b ≤ ZA: Vendor 1 differentiates its product the most, i.e., a∗(b) = 0.
The above lemma represents that if the cost of customization is lower than
a threshold, i.e., C1 ≤ T12ZA , vendor 1 will differentiate its product the most
regardless of its opponent’s level of customization, i.e., a∗ = 0. The reason is
that when the cost of customization is low, the vendor chooses a location in
order to increase the price, see Equation 21, and to prevent price competition.
By changing C1 to C2, S1 to S2, a to b, and ZA to (1− ZA), in the above lemma,
we can derive the same results for vendor 2.
Proof of Lemma 4 is provided in Appendix B.5.
Proposition 2 When consumers do not take security into account, C1 ≤ T12ZA ,
and C2 ≤ T12(1−ZA) location Nash equilibrium is a∗ = b∗ = 0, i.e., maximal
differentiation.
Proof. The Nash equilibrium is the mutually best response. Based on Lemma 4
and its corresponding vendor’s 2 best response, for these cost of customizations,
both vendors’ best responses are equal to zero. uunionsq
For other values of C1 and C2, we calculate Nash equilibria numerically.
A.2 Price Equilibrium for Na¨ıve Consumers in the Presence of Fine
Corollary 2 The Nash equilibrium in prices, which always exists, is
p∗1 = T (1− a− b)
(
1 +
a− b
3
)
+
2f1
3
+
f2
3
, (25)
p∗2 = T (1− a− b)
(
1 +
b− a
3
)
+
2f2
3
+
f1
3
. (26)
B Proof
B.1 Price Nash Equilibrium without Fine
First, we take the partial derivative with respect to price for vendor 1 and have:
∂pi1
∂p1
= D1 (a, b, p1, p2) + p1
∂D1 (a, b, p1, p2)
∂p1
=
p2 − p1
2T (1− a− b) + a+
1− a− b
2
+
β (q1 − q2)
2T (1− a− b) + p1
( −1
2T (1− a− b)
)
,
(27)
the above equation is linear with respect to p1 and the coefficient of p1 is
negative. To find the utility-maximizing price, we set the above value equal to
zero, which gives us the following:
∂pi1
∂p1
= 0 ⇒ pcrit1 =
p2
2
+
T
2
(1− a− b) (1 + a− b) + β (q1 − q2)
2
. (28)
Note that pi1 is increasing in [0, p
crit
1 ] and decreasing in [p
crit
1 ,∞], since the
coefficient of p1 is negative in Equation 27. Therefore, vendor 1’s utility is max-
imized at p∗1 = p
crit
1 . The value of p
∗
1 depends on its location, its rival location,
security quality differences of two vendors, and vendor 2’s product price.
In a similar way, for vendor 2 we have:
∂pi2
∂p2
= D2 (a, b, p1, p2)+p2
∂D2 (a, b, p1, p2)
∂p2
=
p1 − p2
2T (1− a− b) +b+
1− a− b
2
+
β (q2 − q1)
2T (1− a− b) + p2
( −1
2T (1− a− b)
)
. (29)
This is linear in p2 and its coefficient is negative. The critical point is:
∂pi2
∂p2
= 0 ⇒ pcrit2 =
p1
2
+
T
2
(1− a− b) (1− a+ b) + β (q2 − q1)
2T
. (30)
It is straightforward to see that pi2 is increasing in [0, p
crit
2 ] and decreasing in
[pcrit2 ,∞]. Therefore, pcrit2 is local maximum.
By combining Equations 28 and 30, we can derive the Nash equilibrium in
prices which always exists. uunionsq
B.2 Optimization Problem with No Fine
First, we calculate best-response q1 by taking the derivative of Equation 3 with
respect to it and we have:
dpi1
dq1
=
∂pi1
∂q1
+
∂pi1
∂p1
∂p1
∂q1
+
∂pi1
∂p2
∂p2
∂q1
. (31)
Note that in the above equation, we are going to maximize pi1 with respect
to q1 given that Equation 8 is satisfied. According to the envelope theorem,
vendor 1 maximizes its utility with respect to the price in the second stage,
where ∂pi1∂p1 = 0. Therefore, we have:
dpi1
dq1
=
∂pi1
∂q1
+
∂pi1
∂p2
∂p2
∂q1
⇒
dpi1
dq1
= −2S1q1 (a− ZA)2 + p∗1
∂D1
∂q1
+ p∗1
∂D1
∂p2
∂p∗2
∂q1
. (32)
By using Equations 3, 8, and 9, we have:
dpi1
dq1
= −2S1q1 (a− ZA)2 + p∗1
(
β
2T (1− a− b)
)
− p∗1
(
β
6T (1− a− b)
)
= −2S1q1 (a− ZA)2 + p∗1
(
β
3T (1− a− b)
)
. (33)
According to Equation 8, p∗1 is also function of q1. By incorporating Equa-
tion 8 into the above equation, we have:
dpi1
dq1
= q1
(
−2S1 (a− ZA)2 + β
2
9T (1− a− b)
)
+
β
9
(
3 + a− b− βq2
T (1− a− b)
)
.
(34)
The above equation is linear in terms of q1. To make our analysis simpler,
we define the following parameters:
A1 = −2S1 (a− ZA)2+ β
2
9T (1− a− b) , B1 =
β
9
(
3 + a− b− βq2
T (1− a− b)
)
.
(35)
According to the sign of these two parameters, we have:
optq1 (a, b, q2) =

Q if A1 ≥ 0 , B1 ≥ 0
min{−B1A1 , Q} if A1 < 0 , B1 ≥ 0
arg maxq1∈{q¯1,Q} pi1 if A1 ≥ 0 , B1 < 0
q¯1 if A1 < 0 , B1 < 0.
(36)
Where q¯1 = q2 − Tβ (1− a− b) (3 + a− b). The reasons behind the above
formula are as follows:
– A1 ≥ 0 , B1 ≥ 0: In this case, pi1 is increasing for any values q1 ≥ 0. Because
of our constraint, pi1 is maximized at Q.
– A1 < 0 , B1 ≥ 0: pi1 is increasing in [0, −B1A1 ] and decreasing in [−B1A1 ,∞].
– A1 ≥ 0 , B1 < 0: pi1 is decreasing in [0, −B1A1 ] and increasing in [−B1A1 ,∞]. In
this case, two candidate points are 0 and Q. Note that when B1 < 0, q1 = 0
gives negative p1 which is not acceptable. Hence, vendor 1 chooses the lowest
value of q1 that gives non-negative p1. This consideration gives q¯1 as one the
candidate points.
– A1 < 0 , B1 < 0: pi1 is decreasing for all non-negative values of q1, but q1 = 0
gives negative p1. Similar to the previous case, pi1 is maximized at q¯1.
In a similar way for vendor 2 we have:
dpi2
dq2
=
∂pi2
∂q2
+
∂pi2
∂p2
∂p2
∂q2
+
∂pi2
∂p1
∂p1
∂q2
. (37)
According to the envelope theorem, vendor 2 maximizes its utility with re-
spect to the price in the second stage where ∂pi2∂p2 = 0. Therefore, we have:
dpi2
dq2
=
∂pi2
∂q2
+
∂pi2
∂p1
∂p1
∂q2
⇒
dpi2
dq2
= −2S2q2 (1− b− ZA)2 + p∗2
∂D2
∂q2
+ p∗2
∂D2
∂p1
∂p∗1
∂q2
. (38)
By using Equations 4, 8, and 9, we have:
dpi2
dq2
= −2S2q2 (1− b− ZA)2 + p∗2
(
β
2T (1− a− b)
)
− p∗2
(
β
6T (1− a− b)
)
= −2S2q2 (1− b− ZA)2 + p∗2
(
β
3T (1− a− b)
)
. (39)
According to Equation 9, p∗2 is also function of q2. By incorporating Equa-
tion 9 into the above equation, we have:
dpi2
dq2
= q2
(
−2S2 (1− b− ZA)2 + β
2
9T (1− a− b)
)
+
β
9
(
3− a+ b− βq1
T (1− a− b)
)
. (40)
The above equation is linear in terms of q2. To make our analysis simpler,
we define the following parameters:
A2 = −2S2 (1− b− ZA)2 + β
2
9T (1− a− b) ,
B2 =
β
9
(
3− a+ b− βq1
T (1− a− b)
)
. (41)
According to the sign of these two parameters, we have:
optq2 (a, b, q1) =

Q if A2 ≥ 0 , B2 ≥ 0
min{−B2A2 , Q} if A2 < 0 , B2 ≥ 0
arg maxq2∈{q¯2,Q} pi2 if A2 ≥ 0 , B2 < 0
q¯2 if A2 < 0 , B2 < 0.
(42)
Where q¯2 = q1 − Tβ (1− a− b) (3− a+ b).
In order to calculate the optimal location of each player, we take the deriva-
tive with respect to location. First, we start with vendor 1 and we have:
dpi1
da
=
∂pi1
∂p1
∂p1
∂a
+
∂pi1
∂a
+
∂pi1
∂p2
∂p2
∂a
. (43)
Note that in the above equation, we are going to maximize pi1 given that
Equation 8 is satisfied. According to the envelope theorem, vendor 1 maximizes
its utility with respect to the price in the second period where ∂pi1∂p1 = 0. Therefore,
we have:
∂pi1
∂a
=
∂pi1
∂p2
∂p∗2
∂a
+
∂pi1
∂a
= −2C1 (a− ZA)
− 2S1q21 (a− ZA) + p∗1
(
∂D1
∂a
+
∂D1
∂p2
∂p∗2
∂a
)
. (44)
By using Equations 6, 8, and 9, we get:
∂D1
∂a
=
1
2
+
β (q1 − q2) + p∗1 − p∗2
2T (1− a− b)2 =
3− 5a− b
6 (1− a− b) +
β (q1 − q2)
6T (1− a− b)2 . (45)
The first term in the above is called the demand effect, i.e., the direct effect
of a on D1 and pi1. Note that this value can be either positive or negative based
on the values of a and b. Moreover, by using Equations 6, and 9, we have:
∂D1
∂p2
∂p∗2
∂a
=
(
1
2T (1− a− b)
)(
T
(−4 + 2a
3
))
=
a− 2
3 (1− a− b) , (46)
which is called the strategic effect. It shows the indirect effect through the change
in firm 2’s price on D1 and pi1. Note that the above term is negative. By using
Equations 44, 45 and 46, we have:
dpi1
da
= p∗1
(
−1− 3a− b
6 (1− a− b) +
β (q1 − q2)
6T (1− a− b)2
)
− 2C1 (a− ZA)− 2S1q21 (a− ZA) . (47)
Note that we restrict the values of a to be in the interval 0 ≤ a ≤ ZA. By
setting the above equation to zero, we find the corresponding critical points,
and they also should satisfy condition 0 ≤ a ≤ ZA. In addition to these points,
we should also check the boundary points, i.e., 0 and ZA. As a result, we have
a¯ = {0, ZA, a|0 ≤ a ≤ ZA, dpi1da = 0}. This set introduces the potential solutions
for vendor’s 1 locations. Note that a¯ and optq1 (a, b, q2) give the potential best
responses. The one that gives the highest utility provides vendor 1’s best response
that is function of b and q2.
In a similar way, for vendor 2 we have:
dpi2
db
=
∂pi2
∂p2
∂p2
∂b
+
∂pi2
∂b
+
∂pi2
∂p1
∂p1
∂b
. (48)
According to the envelope theorem and ∂pi2∂p2 = 0 in step 2, we have:
dpi2
db
=
∂pi2
∂b
+
∂pi2
∂p1
∂p∗1
∂b
= 2C2 (1− b− ZA)
+ 2S2q
2
2 (1− b− ZA) + p∗2
(
∂D2
∂b
+
∂D2
∂p1
∂p∗1
∂b
)
. (49)
By using Equations 7, 8, and 9 the demand effect of vendor 2 is:
∂D2
∂b
=
1
2
+
p∗1 − p∗2 + β (q2 − q1)
2T (1− a− b)2 =
3− 5b− a
6 (1− a− b) +
β (q2 − q1)
6T (1− a− b)2 . (50)
The strategic effect of vendor 2 based on Equations 7 and 8 is equal to:
∂D2
∂p1
∂p∗1
∂b
=
(
1
2T (1− a− b)
)(
T
(−4 + 2b
3
))
=
b− 2
3 (1− a− b) . (51)
By using the demand effect and the strategic effect of vendor 2, we have:
dpi2
db
= p∗2
(
−1− 3b− a
6 (1− a− b) +
β (q2 − q1)
6T (1− a− b)2
)
+ 2C2 (1− b− ZA) + 2S2q22 (1− b− ZA) . (52)
Note that we restrict the values of b to be in interval 0 ≤ b ≤ ZA. By
setting the above equation to zero, we find the corresponding critical points,
and they also should satisfy condition 0 ≤ b ≤ ZA. In addition to these points,
we should also check the boundary points, i.e., 0 and ZA. As a result, we have
b¯ = {0, ZA, b|0 ≤ b ≤ ZA, dpi2db = 0}. This set introduces the potential solutions
for vendor’s 2 locations. Note that b¯ and optq2 (a, b, q1) give the potential best
responses. The one that gives the highest utility provides vendor 2’s best response
that is function of a and q1.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 1
According to a vendor’s security quality best responses, e.g., Equation 36, best
response security equality is not equal to zero unless B1 is equal to zero and A1 is
negative. If q2 = 0, B1 is positive regardless of the location choices. Therefore, we
have optq1 (a, b, q2) = Q or optq1 (a, b, q2) = min
(
−B1
A1
, Q
)
which are not equal
to zero. q1 = q2 = 0 is NE if B1 = B2 = 0 and A1, A2 < 0 are both satisfied.
B1 = B2 = 0 never happens unless 1−a− b = 0 which means that both vendors
are at the same location. If both vendors are at the same location as ZA, this
means that both of them have the quality Q. If they are at a different location
than ZA, the utility of customization is negative which is not acceptable for both
vendors. Therefore, q1 = q2 = 0 is not NE. uunionsq
B.4 Price Nash Equilibrium with Fine
By taking the partial derivative with respect to price of firm 1, we have:
∂pi1
∂p1
= D1 + (p1 − f1) ∂D1
∂p1
=
p2 − p1
2T (1− a− b) + a
+
1− a− b
2
+
β (q1 − q2)
2T (1− a− b) + (p1 − f1)
( −1
2T (1− a− b)
)
. (53)
The above equation is linear in p1 and its coefficient is negative. Setting the
above value to zero gives the following:
∂pi1
∂p1
= 0 ⇒ pcrit1 =
p2
2
+
T
2
(1− a− b) (1 + a− b) + β
2
(q1 − q2) + f1
2
. (54)
Assuming that pcrit1 ≥ 0, pi1 is increasing in [0, pcrit1 ] and decreasing in
[pcrit1 ,∞]. Therefore, pcrit1 is maximum.
In a similar way, for vendor 2 we have:
∂pi2
∂p2
= D2 + (p2 − f2) ∂D2
∂p2
=
p1 − p2
2T (1− a− b) + b
+
1− a− b
2
+
β (q2 − q1)
2T (1− a− b) + (p2 − f2)
( −1
2T (1− a− b)
)
, (55)
which is linear in p2 and its coefficient is negative. By setting the above
equation to zero, we have:
∂pi2
∂p2
= 0 ⇒ pcrit2 =
p1
2
+
T
2
(1− a− b) (1− a+ b)
+
β
2
(q2 − q1) + f2
2
. (56)
Assuming that pcrit2 ≥ 0,pi2 is increasing in [0, pcritG ] and decreasing in [pcritG ,∞].
Hence, maximum is pcrit2 .
Solving both Equations 54 and 56 provides the Nash equilibrium in price
being represented in Theorem 2. Note that this Nash equilibrium always exists.
uunionsq
B.5 Proof of Lemma 4
In order to calculate a and b, based on Equations 47 and 52, we have:
dpi1
da
= p∗1
(−1− 3a− b
6 (1− a− b)
)
− 2C1 (a− ZA) , (57)
dpi2
db
= p∗2
(−1− 3b− a
6 (1− a− b)
)
+ 2C2 (1− b− ZA) , (58)
where p∗1 and p
∗
2 are equal to Equations 21 and 22, respectively. By assigning
p∗1 and p
∗
2 into the above equations, we have:
dpi1
da
=
1
18
(−3Ta2+a (2Tb− 10T − 36C1)+T
(
b2 − 2b− 3
)
+36C1ZA), (59)
which is quadratic in terms of a.
dpi2
db
=
1
18
(−3Tb2 + b (2Ta− 10T − 36C2)
+ T
(
a2 − 2a− 3
)
+ 36C2(1− ZA), (60)
which is quadratic in terms of b.
In a quadratic function like Ax2 + Bx+ C = 0, if ∆ = B2 − 4AC ≥ 0, that
equation has two roots, which we call x1 and x2. Further, we have x1 +x2 =
−B
A
and x1x2 =
C
A . If ∆ < 0, the quadratic function does not reach zero and its sign
is the same as the sign of A.
By setting Equation 59, i.e., dpi1da = 0, we have a quadratic function in a.
In this equation, we have A = −3T < 0, B = 2Tb − 10T − 36C1 < 0, and
C = T
(
b2 − 2b− 3)+ 36C1ZA. If C ≤ 0, ∆ can be both positive or negative. If
∆ ≤ 0, this means that dpi1da is negative for any values of a. In other words, pi1 is
decreasing in terms of a. Therefore, we have a∗ = 0. If ∆ > 0, this means that
dpi1
da = 0 has two roots, i.e., a1 and a2. Moreover, we have a1a2 =
C
A > 0 and
a1 + a2 =
−B
A < 0. This means that both a1 and a2 are negative and for any
non-negative value of a, dpi1da is negative. This gives that a
∗ = 0, In summary,
when C ≤ 0, we have a∗ = 0.
For the case where C > 0, we have ∆ > 0 and as result dpi1da = 0 has two roots,
i.e., a1 and a2. One of them is negative, a1 < 0, and the other one is positive,
a2 > 0. Because, we have a1a2 =
C
A < 0 and a1 + a2 =
−B
A < 0. Hence, pi1 is
increasing in [0, a2]. Note that we have assumed that a ∈ [0, ZA]. Therefore, we
have a∗ = min{a2, ZA}. In summary, we have:
a∗ =
{
0 if T
(
b2 − 2b− 3)+ 36C1ZA ≤ 0
min{a2, ZA} if T
(
b2 − 2b− 3)+ 36C1ZA > 0.
The condition of the above equation is quadratic in b. Let’s call the root of
this quadratic function (if it exists), i.e., T
(
b2 − 2b− 3) + 36C1ZA = 0, as b¯1
and b¯2, where b¯1 ≤ b¯2. By doing a similar analysis, we can rewrite a∗ as follows:
a∗ =

0 if C1 ≤ T12ZA
min{a2, ZA} if C1 ≥ T9ZA
min{a2, ZA} if T12ZA < C1 < T9ZA
& 0 ≤ b ≤ min{ZA, b¯1}
0 if T12ZA < C1 <
T
9ZA
& b¯1 ≤ ZA & b¯1 ≤ b ≤ ZA,
where b¯1 = 1−
√
4− 36C1T ZA.
In a similar way, for vendor 2 we have:
b∗ =
{
0 if T
(
a2 − 2a− 3)+ 36C2(1− ZA) ≤ 0
min{b2, ZA} if T
(
a2 − 2a− 3)+ 36C2(1− ZA) > 0,
where b1 and b2 are two roots of
dpi2
db = 0 in which b1 ≤ b2. Note that the
condition of the above equation is quadratic in terms of a. Similar to vendor 1,
we have:
b∗ =

0 if C2 ≤ T12(1−ZA)
min{b2, ZA} if C2 ≥ T9(1−ZA)
min{b2, ZA} if T12(1−ZA) < C2 < T9(1−ZA)
& 0 ≤ a ≤ min{ZA, a¯1}
0 if T12(1−ZA) < C2 <
T
9(1−ZA)
& a¯1 ≤ ZA & a¯1 ≤ a ≤ ZA,
where a¯1 = 1−
√
4− 36C1T (1− ZA).
B.6 Quality Nash Equilibrium with Fine
For quality calculation, we should take into account that the calculated price is a
function of quality. By taking the partial derivative of Equation 13 with respect
to quality, we have:
dpi1
dq1
=
∂pi1
∂q1
+
∂pi1
∂p1
∂p1
∂q1
+
∂pi1
∂p2
∂p2
∂q1
. (61)
Note that in the above equation, we are going to maximize pi1 given that
Equation 15 is satisfied. According to the envelope theorem, vendor 1 maximizes
its utility with respect to the price in the second stage where ∂pi1∂p1 = 0. Therefore,
we have:
dpi1
dq1
=
∂pi1
∂q1
+
∂pi1
∂p2
∂p2
∂q1
⇒ dpi1
dq1
= −2S1q1 (a− ZA)2
−D1 ∂f1
∂q1
+ (p∗1 − f1)
∂D1
∂q1
+ p∗1
∂D1
∂p2
∂p∗2
∂q1
. (62)
By using Equations 6 and 16, we have:
∂D1
∂p2
∂p∗2
∂q1
=
(
1
2T (1− a− b)
)(
1
3
∂f1
∂q1
− β
3
)
. (63)
Both the above equations show that we need to calculate ∂f1∂q1 . By considering
Equation 12, we have:
∂f1
∂q1
=
{
−F if qmin ≥ q1
0 if qmin < q1.
(64)
Note that for q1 = q
min, ∂f1∂q1 is not defined. But, here, we assume that this
value is equal to −F . Therefore, for q1 ≤ qmin, Equation 62 changes into:
∂pi1
∂q1
= q1
(
−2S1 (a− ZA)2 + (β + F )
2
9T (1− a− b)
)
+
β + F
9
(
3 + a− b+ f2 − βq2 − Fq
min
T (1− a− b)
)
. (65)
The above equation is linear in q1. In a linear equation like cq1 + d in which
c, d ≥ 0, cq1 + d is positive for every nonnegative value of q1. If this condition is
satisfied for Equation 65, pi1 is increasing in [0, q
min] and as a result, pi1 (a, b, q) is
maximized at qmin in interval [0, qmin]. Here, in our analysis, we assume that the
consumers do not take security into account, i.e., β = 0. Hence, for q1 > q
min,
by considering Equations 12 and 64, Equation 62 is equal to the following:
∂pi1
∂q1
= −2S1q1 (a− ZA)2 . (66)
The above Equation is negative for all values of q1. This means that pi1 is
decreasing in q1 and as a result, pi1 is maximized at q
min in interval [qmin, Q].
Therefore, by considering both Equations 65 and 66, we have q∗1 = q
min if the
following two conditions are satisfied:
F 2 − 18TS1 (1− a− b) (a− ZA)2 ≥ 0, (67)
3 + a− b+ f2 − Fq
min
T (1− a− b) ≥ 0. (68)
In a similar way, vendor 2 invests in q∗2 = q
min if the following two conditions
are satisfied:
F 2 − 18TS2 (1− a− b) (1− b− ZA)2 ≥ 0, (69)
3 + a− b+ f1 − Fq
min
T (1− a− b) ≥ 0. (70)
If both vendor 1 and vendor 2 invest in qmin level of security, we have f1 =
f2 = 0. If Equations 67 and 69 are satisfied in addition to the following equation,
both vendors will invest in qmin level of security.
3 + a− b− Fq
min
T (1− a− b) ≥ 0.uunionsq (71)
B.7 Proof of Lemmas 3
When consumers do not take security into account, i.e., β = 0, and q∗1 = q
∗
2 =
qmin, we have:
dpi1
da
= p∗1
(−1− 3a− b
6 (1− a− b)
)
− 2
(
C1 + S1
(
qmin
)2)
(a− ZA) , (72)
dpi2
db
= p∗2
(−1− 3b− a
6 (1− a− b)
)
+ 2
(
C2 + S2
(
qmin
)2)
(1− b− ZA) . (73)
It is similar to the case where there is no fine except that C1 and C2 change
into C1 + S1
(
qmin
)2
and C2 + S2
(
qmin
)2
, respectively. uunionsq
